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X-WR-CALNAME:[gt.go] - 'The Popular Dimension of Matchings' by Agnes Totsch
 nig
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TZUNTIL:20271031T010000Z
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DESCRIPTION:A central concept in social choice theory is that of a Condorce
 t winner: an outcome that defeats every alternative in a pairwise majority
  vote. While compelling\, this notion is famously fragile\, as Condorcet’s
  paradox shows that such a winner need not exist at all. This tension betw
 een desirability and nonexistence motivates much of modern voting theory. 
 \n\nIn this talk\, we explore how these ideas arise in matching problems\,
  where voters’ preferences over potential matches induce an election over 
 all possible matchings. The appropriate analogue of a Condorcet winner in 
 this setting is a popular matching\, defined via pairwise elections betwee
 n matchings that account carefully for ties in preferences. As in classica
 l social choice\, popular matchings are highly appealing when they exist\,
  but unfortunately\, they often do not. \n\nTo address this\, we study a n
 atural relaxation: instead of a single winning matching\, we allow a set o
 f matchings that collectively defeats any alternative matching. This leads
  to the notion of the popular dimension\, defined as the minimum size of s
 uch a winning set\, in the worst case\, for a given class of matching prob
 lems. We will present algorithmic results and open questions on the popula
 r dimension for three classical settings: the house allocation problem\, t
 he marriage problem\, and the roommates problem. \n\nJoint work with Frank
  Connor\, Louis-Roy Langevin\, Ndiamé Ndiaye\, Rohit Vasishta and Adrian V
 etta. \n\n(Agnes Totschnig) [MIT] \n\n\nVérifiez que vous êtes bien inscri
 ts sur le site du [gdr-ifm-gt-graphes] : [ https://gtgraphes.labri.fr/pmwi
 ki/pmwiki.php/Equipes/Equipes#membres | https://gtgraphes.labri.fr/pmwiki/
 pmwiki.php/Equipes/Equipes#membres ] \n\nRemarks / Remarques \n\nFind all 
 the information of the working group on this [ https://graphesetoptimisati
 on.labri.fr/pmwiki.php/Groupe/GT?userlang=en | web page ] . \nRetrouvez to
 utes les informations du GT sur cette [ https://graphesetoptimisation.labr
 i.fr/pmwiki.php/Groupe/GT | page web ] . \n\n\n\nImport automatique depuis
  https://webmel.u-bordeaux.fr/home/bf-labri.ca@u-bordeaux.fr/gt.go.ics par
  sync_icals_to_drupal.py pour GT-GO
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20260123T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20260123T150000
LOCATION:LaBRI/178
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SUMMARY:[gt.go] - 'The Popular Dimension of Matchings' by Agnes Totschnig
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